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Food ethics is on the rise, and this is thanks, in no small 
part, to animal ethicists. Unlike some commentators, Anne 
Barnhill, Mark Budolfson, and Tyler Doggett situate questions 
about animals close to the core of the subdiscipline in their 
introduction to The Oxford Handbook of Food Ethics. Animal 
ethicists should applaud this, and be quick to criticise those 
food ethicists who overlook (questions about) our duties to 
other animals. After all, animal ethics has long placed food 
close to the centre of its concern. But, in turn, animal ethicists 
should expect fair critique from philosophers of food if they 
fail to take food seriously, just as Regan criticised Singer for 
assuming away the value of food (The Case, §6.4). The ethi-
cal and philosophical significance of food does not begin and 
end with harm to animals, and to talk about harm to animals 
in food production without thinking seriously about food itself 
is to risk the development of intellectually impoverished posi-
tions.
If one wants to think seriously about food ethics, especially 
concerning the relationship it has to animal ethics, I would 
struggle to think of a better starting place than The Oxford 
Handbook of Food Ethics. Animals are rarely far from the 
minds of the contributors, and any philosopher interested in 
the ethics of veganism will find a great deal that is of interest 
in the book’s pages.
The book contains eight sections: “Conventional Agricul-
ture and Alternatives”; “Animals”; “Consumption”; “Food Jus-
tice and Social Justice”; “Ethics and Politics of Food Policy”; 
“Gender, Body Image, and ‘Healthy’ Eating”; “Food and So-
cial Identities, Cultural Practices, and Values”; and “History of 
Philosophy and Food Ethics.” The amount of animal ethics in 
the volume is belied by the fact that the “Animals” section con-
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tains only three essays. Two will not raise eyebrows for read-
ers of BTS: Gary Comstock reviews cattle cognition to argue 
that those in developed nations should not eat beef, while Eliot 
Michaelson and Andrew Reisner offer a range of arguments 
to conclude that we should not be eating fish or supporting the 
fishing industry.
Charles List authors the other chapter in the section. He ad-
dresses the “new hunter”—the informed individual who hunts 
out of a concern for animal welfare, food systems, and other so-
cial issues. He argues that new-hunter-ism does not obviously 
do better than locavorism on animal-welfare or transparency 
grounds. And he critically examines the new hunter’s concern 
for feeling the “right” emotions when killing an animal, and 
with engaging in “natural” processes. But List certainly does 
not think that those who care about animal welfare, food sys-
tems, and relationships with animals should be vegan. He is 
rightfully critical of some bad arguments in favour of hunt-
ing—“new” or “old”—but he firmly believes that hunting has 
a cluster of merits. As well as providing “good healthy food” 
(184), it can develop skills leading to virtues of ecological 
awareness, emotional sensitivity to animals/habitats/the “won-
ders” (186) of nature, and the capacity to be good biotic citi-
zens. List implores new hunters to exercise this final capacity, 
and become “activists in defence of their biotic community” 
(187). As far as I can tell, this activism is mostly geared around 
ensuring that people can continue to hunt. There is little con-
cern for animals, here. List thus diverges from the new hunt-
ers, who—misguidedly or otherwise—do have a concern for 
humaneness. Indeed, in List’s conclusion, he talks of advocacy 
not for humaneness, but for humanness (187). I assume this is 
an error, but it is telling: List’s contribution feels like the most 
“anti-animal” in the book.
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Real highlights for me are the three initial chapters in the 
“Consumption” section. Tristram McPherson, Bob Fischer, and 
Julia Nesky provide masterful and up-to-date reviews of, re-
spectively, arguments for veganism, arguments for consuming 
animal products, and the causal impotence of consumers. All 
three are very strong essays; they would be stellar places to 
begin a research project, or would make excellent additions to 
reading lists.
McPherson focuses in on the wrongness of the killing and 
suffering inherent in animal agriculture, but identifies the real 
difficulty in extrapolating from this wrong to an individual 
moral obligation to be vegan. There is, he says, a premise that 
needs to be filled in: what is the relationship between one’s own 
non-veganism and these wrongful harms? Possible answers in-
clude the following: we are (potentially or actually) individu-
ally responsible; we are collectively responsible; we benefit; we 
are complicit. Even if this gap can be filled in, however, there 
are a range of other challenges that vegan philosophers need to 
resolve: McPherson hopes to “encourage others to rigorously 
address these topics” (236).
Given the very low chance that any individual consumer im-
pacts unethical production practices, why should we be vegan? 
Nefsky rejects standard arguments about expected utility (“My 
non-purchase might be the one that closes a farm!”) or indirect-
ly making a difference (“I’ll make all my friends and family 
vegan!”) with compelling arguments, and so non-instrumental 
reasons in favour of veganism are canvassed. Meat-eaters (of-
ten) benefit from wrongdoing, but Nefsky is not convinced that 
this a good reason to condemn them. Refusing meat may have 
symbolic significance in a variety of ways, but these raise a 
host of tricky puzzles. Ultimately, Nefsky argues that the best 
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answer is the “naïve” one: refusing meat “makes real progress 
to toward preventing gave harms or injustices”. The tricky—
even mysterious—part is “seeing how this could be true when 
one’s [refusal] will not make a difference” (285).
Fischer, too, addresses causal inefficacy, among a range 
of other issues. He helpfully identifies several key takeaways 
from his wide review of arguments in defence of meat-eating: 
the significance of animal deaths in arable agriculture; the 
significance of non-traditional sources of animal products (in-
vertebrates, in vitro meat, freeganism, etc.); the environmental 
costs of animal agriculture; the relationship between abstract 
rights and concrete practice; the potential virtue of embracing 
one’s involvement with harm to animals (think, again, of List 
and feeling the “right” thing); and the (in principle) distinc-
tion between innocuous use and problematic exploitation. At-
tention to these issues will provide the most compelling pos-
sible defences of the consumption of animal products, Fischer 
claims. Indeed, he finishes by attempting just such a defence, 
and forwards the imperative that we “eat unusually”: “there 
appear to be good reasons to eat roadkill, bugs, bivalves, in 
vitro meat, animal products that will be wasted, and the bodies 
and byproducts of animals that live full, pleasant lives” (263). 
Whether he is right or not, it is hard to argue with this conclu-
sion.
McPherson, Nefsky, and Fischer’s contributions share a few 
themes. One is the puzzle about how our individual dietary 
choices are not likely to affect the food system. Another chap-
ter that focuses on this is Andrew Chignell’s engaging paper—
ostensibly on religion and food—about how a hope (or faith) 
that we can make a difference could allow us to overcome the 
psychological barrier that our awareness of our own impotence 
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can introduce. Paul B. Thompson’s reflections on agrarianism, 
meanwhile, offer some tantalising tidbits about how to bypass 
causal-impotence arguments altogether. 
Another commonality between the chapters of McPherson, 
Nefsky, and Fischer is that all provide powerful-but-sympa-
thetic challenges to vegans. Mark Budolfson’s characteristi-
cally strong chapter does the same. He criticises the standard 
idea that we should be promoting some given food system (e.g., 
a vegan system) because that would be the least harmful that 
provides us with enough food. This, he thinks, is morally and 
empirically dubious—morally because the food system of ideal 
theory need not have a clear relationship with the food system 
we should promote in non-ideal circumstances, and empirical-
ly because, even assuming “vegan values” (91), lots of vegan 
foods are far less harmful, overall, than some non-vegan foods. 
Budolfson’s example is mussels: they are (he says) non-sen-
tient, and mussel-farming practices require little land or water, 
and produce little by way of pollution, greenhouse-gas emis-
sions, or harm to human workers. A tick for Fischer’s unusual 
eating, it seems.
There are plenty of other chapters that contain material di-
rectly relevant to animal ethicists: Jeff Sebo’s consideration of 
“multi-issue” food activism contains much on animal activ-
ism; Christina Van Dyke offers a useful reflection on the rela-
tionship between veganism and eating disorders; and readers 
would be foolish to skip the final two chapters. The book closes 
with Henrik Lagerlund on medieval food ethics and John Grey 
and Aaron Garrett on “modern philosophical dietetics.” Both 
pieces contain fascinating historical resources for thinking se-
riously about the normative status of animals and the ethics of 
veganism. How many readers could call to mind Augustine’s 
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rejection of vegetarianism, Maimonides’s justification for the 
Jewish proscription on pork, Anne Conway’s comments on the 
status of animals, or the vegetarian politics of John Oswald? 
Even for the most ahistorical of animal ethicists, these argu-
ments will be interesting.
All this said, I implore animal ethicists interested in food-re-
lated matters to take seriously even those chapters that are not, 
at first glance, relevant to animal ethics. To borrow the words 
of Susan Wolf, compared to the “weighty issues” relating to 
animals, some topics of food ethics are “undeniably frivolous” 
(722). But if we want to take food ethics seriously—and, if we 
want to talk about food, we should—we must be aware of these 
questions. As I’ve said, animal ethicists’ arguments about food 
are impoverished if they do not take seriously the wider issues 
of food ethics, which will, in any case, often reveal themselves 
to be highly relevant for animal ethicists when explored in ear-
nest.
Wolf addresses the ethics of being a foodie—and the en-
counter with the foodie will be one familiar to many vegans. 
Shen-Yi Liao and Aaron Meskin’s excellent contribution on the 
relationship between food ethics and food aesthetics is also rel-
evant, here. The authors draw frequently on wrongs to animals, 
and ultimately defend a position of “food immoralism,” accord-
ing to which the morality of a food practice does have an im-
pact upon its aesthetics, but that this need not always be a direct 
relationship: the immorality of a food practice, depending on 
the circumstances, can increase or decrease its aesthetic val-
ues, for instance. Foodies and aesthetes may often be defenders 
of ethically dubious practices, but there’s no reason they should 
inherently be so, and it is clear from these chapters that Wolf, 
Liao, and Meskin treat issues relating to harm-to-animals with 
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the scholarly seriousness they warrant. Even Thompson, in his 
chapter on agrarian philosophy—another position we might 
assume to be opposed to veganism—could not be accused of 
ignoring or dismissing either animals or vegetarianism.
Karen Stohr and Sarah Conly address etiquette and pater-
nalism respectively; neither mention animals, but both offer 
engaging papers on core questions of food ethics, and precisely 
the sort of thing animal ethicists serious about food should be 
thinking about. I do not mean to criticise them for not mention-
ing animals, incidentally. As will—by now—be clear, the book 
is replete with sympathetic, informed, and careful consideration 
of animals. Only in a few places did I find myself frustrated by 
such consideration’s absence. Jaclyn Hatala Matthes and Er-
ich Hatala Matthes, it seemed, only reluctantly acknowledged 
the wastefulness of animal agriculture in their chapter on food 
waste. Kyle Powys Whyte, meanwhile, has an unfortunately 
anthropocentric approach to food justice. It occurs, he tells us, 
“when at least one human group systematically dominates one 
or more other human groups through their connections to and 
interactions with one another in local and global food systems” 
(345). Whether this is the only time food injustice occurs in 
Whyte’s eyes is unclear (cf. 12-3), but that the sentence twice 
includes the word human gives an indication, I think, of where 
Whyte’s sympathies lie. And the contribution on food labour 
ethics, by Tyler Doggett and Seth M. Holmes, might frustrate 
some readers with its references to how people are treated as 
(or like) animals. It was an engaging read, though, and covers a 
topic of undeniable importance.
The Oxford Handbook of Food Ethics contains some 35 
chapters across over 800 pages. There is thus a lot that I have 
missed out of this review, though perhaps some of the other 
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chapters will be of less interest to readers of BTS. My not men-
tioning a given chapter should not be taken as an indication that 
it was not worth including, or is not worth reading. Indeed, in 
contrast to other handbooks, I found few of the contributions 
to be weak links—though, of course, any book of this length 
is going to have some chapters weaker than others. And while, 
perhaps, there are other topics that could have been included, 
given the already impressive length of the book, I am not going 
to criticise it on that account. Recall that this is a handbook, not 
an encyclopedia.
In short, I thoroughly recommend The Oxford Handbook 
of Food Ethics to all animal ethicists interested in addressing 
food-related questions in their research or teaching. I have al-
ready made ample use of it in both my own teaching and my 
own research. I have no doubt that I will continue to do so.
